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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
Case No. 20070419-CA

vs.
JACOB B. LOVELESS,
Defendant/Appellee.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
* * *

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The State appeals from, the trial court's interlocutory order permitting
defendant to enter a guilty plea to the alternative lesser offense of reckless
endangerment. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 77-18a-l(l)(c)
(West 2004) and Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(d) (West 2004).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
May a trial court accept a defendant's guilty plea to an alternative lesser
charge over the prosecutor's objection and in the face of the prosecutor's alternative
motion to dismiss the lesser charge?
Standard of Review. This Court "review[s] a trial court's acceptance or rejection
of a guilty plea under an abuse of discretion standard." State v. Turner, 980 P.2d
1188,1189-90 (Utah App. 1998).

Preservation. The issue was preserved at the April 9, 2007 hearing, which
considered defendant's notice of intent to enter a guilty plea to the alternative lesser
charge of reckless endangerment. See R. 476. The issue was also preserved in the
State's memorandum in support of its motion to reconsider and at the hearing on
the motion to reconsider held on April 10, 2007. R. 462-38; R. 477.
RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS
§ 76-5-103. Aggravated assault
(1) A person commits aggravated assault if he commits assault as defined
i ~ C ^ ^ J - : ^ ^ nc c m o r n ~*A
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(a) intentionally causes serious bodily injury to another; or
(b) under circumstances not amounting to a violation of Subsection
(l)(a), uses a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601 or other
means or force likely to produce death or serious bodily injury.
(2) A violation of Subsection (l)(a) is a second degree felony.
(3) A violation of Subsection (l)(b) is a third degree felony.
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-5-103; Laws 1974, c. 32, § 10; Laws 1989, c. 170, § 2; Laws 1995, c. 291, § 5, eff. May 1,
1995.

§ 76-5-112, Reckless endangerment—Penalty
(1) A person commits reckless endangerment if, under circumstances not
amounting to a felony offense, the person recklessly engages in conduct that
creates a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to another person.
(2) Reckless endangerment is a class A misdemeanor.
Laws 1999, c. 66, § 1, eff. May 3,1999.

1

An assault includes "an act, committed with unlawful force or violence, to
do bodily injury to another." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102(l)(c) (West 2004).

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
While at a late night party at a campsite, defendant fired his .45 caliber
handgun into a sleeping bag occupied by the victim, causing him serious bodily
injury.

See R. 62-60, 67-66.

The State charged defendant with reckless

endangerment, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-112
(West 2004). R. 1. The State later filed an amended information, charging defendant
with aggravated assault, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 765-103 (West 2004), or alternatively, reckless endangerment.

R. 25-24.

After

defendant was bound over on the alternative charges, he unsuccessfully moved to
quash the bindover. R. 45-44,77-72.2 After more than a year of litigation on various
defense motions, the case was ready to proceed to trial. See R. 87-84,299-56 (motion
to quash jury list); R. 423-27,07 (motion to exclude evidence of alcohol or drug use).
Four days before trial was to begin, defendant filed a notice of intent to enter
a guilty plea to the alternative lesser charge of reckless endangerment and requested
that the matter be set for a plea hearing. R. 431-30. At a pretrial conference three
days later, the State objected to the plea attempt, arguing that defendant could not
unilaterally decide to enter a plea to an alternative charge.
2

R. 476: 4-5.

The informations also charged defendant with possession of a dangerous
weapon while under the influence, a class B misdemeanor. R. 1,25-24. That charge
was bound over for trial, but later dismissed on defendant's motion to quash the
bindover. R. 74-73. The dismissal of that charge is not at issue on appeal.
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Alternatively, the State moved to dismiss the alternative charge of reckless
endangerment R. 476:6-7. The trial court rejected both arguments. The court ruled
that by charging alternative offenses, the State gave defendant the option of
pleading guilty to one or the other, and having done so, could not object to a plea to
the alternative charge or otherwise dismiss the alternative charge after defendant
stated an intention to so plead. R. 476: 19-21; R. 434-33. At the scheduled plea
hearing the following day, the State filed a motion to reconsider. R. 462-38. The
court denied the motion and entered findings of fact and conclusions of law on both
motions. R. 437-36,472-67 (Addendum). That same day, the court entered an order
to stay a plea hearing pending resolution of the State's petition for interlocutory
appeal. R. 474-73. This Court granted the State's petition for interlocutory appeal.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The prosecutor not only has broad discretion in determining whether to file
charges and what charges to file, but also to determine in what manner to prosecute
a case. The prosecutor's discretion in prosecuting a case does not, therefore, end
with the filing of the information, but includes such decisions as whether to dismiss
a charge and whether to agree to a plea to a lesser offense. The prosecutor's
decision to file alternative charges does not remove that discretion. The trial court
thus abused its discretion in permitting defendant to plead to the alternative lesser
offense over the prosecutor's objection.

4

ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN PERMITTING
DEFENDANT TO PLEAD TO AN ALTERNATIVE LESSER OFFENSE
OVER THE PROSECUTOR'S OBJECTION
The trial court ruled that "defendant has the right to enter a plea to the
alternative offense" of reckless endangerment R. 468. The court explained that "the
State takes that chance when [it] files in the alternative, especially ... where the
alternative was a lesser valued or a lesser charged Class A misdemeanor, with lesser
punishments/ 7 R. 476:19. The court further ruled that once a defendant has stated
his intention to plead to the lesser offense, the State cannot frustrate that intent by
dismissing the alternative charge. See R. 476: 21. The State filed a motion to
reconsider, which the trial court denied. R. 472-67; R. 477: 26-38. The trial court's
ruling permitting defendant to plead guilty to the alternative lesser charge over the
prosecutor's objection was an abuse of its discretion.
This Court's decision in State v. Turner, 980 P.2d 1188 (Utah App. 1998)
controls. In Turner, a motorcyclist was killed after colliding with Turner's truck,
which had swerved over the center line. Id. at 1189. Turner was charged with
driving left of center and negligent homicide. Id. Over the State's objection, Turner
pled guilty to driving left of center and was sentenced on that charge. Id. Turner
thereafter argued that because he pled guilty and had been sentenced to a lesser
included crime, the State was precluded from pursuing the negligent homicide

5

charge. Id. The trial court agreed, ruling that '"[w]hen the activity of a defendant
involved in such an episode establishes offenses which may be punishable in
different ways, the conduct shall be punished under only one such provision and a
conviction or entry of guilty plea and sentence on one bars a prosecution on the
other/" Id. (quoting trial court).
In reversing the ruling of the trial court, Turner held that a defendant "ha[s]
no absolute right to have his plea of guilt accepted/ 7 Id. at 1190. This Court held
that although a trial court has discretion to accept or reject a guilty plea, that
"[discretion is abused if the actions of the judge are inherently unfair/' or if the
judge's decision is otherwise '"beyond the limits of reasonableness/" Id. (quoting
State v. Olsen, 860 P.2d 332,334 (Utah 1993)). The Court also held that "'[a]n abuse
of discretion results when the judge fails to consider all legally relevant factors/" Id.
(quoting State v. Montoya, 929 P.2d 356,358 (Utah 1996)).
Turner observed that "'[s]ociety has [an] interest in the vindication of criminal
justice and . . . the state . . . ha[s] an interest in an error free determination of the
case/" Id. (citations omitted). Accordingly, the Court concluded that "acceptance of
the plea over the timely and specific objections of the State was unfair and
unreasonable" because it "effectively nullified the State's right to prosecute
defendant on the charge of negligent homicide." Id.

6

In this case, the Fourth District Court's decision to accept defendant's plealto
reckless endangerment, over the timely and specific objections of the State, was, las
in Turner, "unfair and unreasonable." Id. As in Turner, the district court's acticfn
will "effectively nulliffy] the State's right to prosecute defendant" on a particular
charge in its pursuit of society's interest "'in the vindication of criminal justice/" i.4.,
aggravated assault. Id.; cf. State v. Studham, 655 P.2d 669, 671 (Utah 1992) (holding
that defendant does not have the right to waive a jury trial). For this reason, this
Court should reverse the ruling of the trial court.
The trial court concluded, however, that Turner does not apply here becausb
this case involves an alternative offense, rather than a "lesser offense," as in Turnet.
R. 468. Whether or not reckless endangerment is a lesser offense to aggravated
assault, the distinction is irrelevant. The effect in either case is to preclude the Statf
from exercising its right to prosecute the case in the manner it deems appropriate*
As observed by the Utah Supreme Court three decades ago, when the State charged
in the alternative, it "need not make an election upon which theory it will proceed if
the theories specified in the information are not repugnant to each other." State Vi
Butler, 560 P.2d 1136,1138 (Utah 1977). It follows that defendant cannot force thai
election, or take away the State's right to try a defendant in the alternative, by
simply pleading to the alternative charge.

7

Prosecutors enjoy "the traditional discretion ... to determine what crime to
charge/ 7 State v. Mohi, 901 P.2d 991, 1003 (Utah 1995). That charging discretion
includes the right to "charge offenses in the alternative." State v. Montoya, 910 P.2d
441,443 (Utah 1996) (citing Utah R. Crim. P. 4(i)). But a prosecutor's discretion in
pursuing a prosecution does not end with the filing of an information. Prosecutors
are not only given the discretion to determine whether to prosecute a case and what
charges to file, but also the discretion to determine "in what manner to prosecute [a]
case." State v. Bell, 785 P.2d 390, 402 (Utah 1989) (plurality opinion) (emphasis
added); accord State v. Geer, 765 P.2d 1,3 (Utah App. 1988).3 The discretion vested in
the prosecutor includes the authority "'to determine whether or not to prosecute,
what charge should be made, and whether or not to dismiss, apply for immunity, or
accept a plea to a lesser offense/" Bell, 785 P.2d at 404 (quoting State v. Grayer, 215
N.W.2d 859, 861 (Neb. 1974)). In other words, as a general rule, the prosecutor
directs the entire prosecution, from the filing of the charges to the presentation of
the evidence to the jury. A defendant cannot sabotage that discretion by pleading to
an alternative lesser charge.

3

An abuse of the prosecutor's discretion will be found if based on arbitrary
classifications in violation of a defendant's right to equal protection under the
Fourteenth Amendment or right to the uniform operation of laws under article I,
section 24 of the Utah Constitution. See Bell, 785 P.2d at 403; Mohi, 901 P.2d at 9951004. Such equal protection issues are not implicated here.
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The trial court reasoned that by filing an alternative lesser offense, the
prosecutor took the "chance" that defendant would plead guilty to the lesser offense
and was therefore "getting what [he] deservefd]."' R. 476: 19, 24. The court thiis
ruled, in effect, that a prosecutor cedes to defendant his or her control over tie
prosecution once the charges have been filed. But, as reiterated by the Utdh
Supreme Court in Montoya, "'a criminal trial is much more than just a content
between the State and an individual which is determined by strategies appropriate
to determining the outcome of a game/" Montoya, 910 P.2d at 446 (quoting State | .
Howellf 649 P.2d 91,94 (Utah 1982)). Rather, it "'is the vindication of the laws of n
civilized society against those who are guilty of transgressing those laws/" Id.
(quoting Howell, 649 P.2d at 94). For this reason, a trial court may instruct a jury om
a necessarily included offense that was not specifically charged in the informatioit
Howell, 649 P.2d at 94-95. As explained in Howell, "it would be a mockery of out
criminal laws for a court to ignore a proved crime and acquit on the charged crime!
when the defendant is not prejudiced in presenting a full and complete defense tcf
the proved crime." Id. at 95.
It would likewise be a mockery of our criminal laws to permit a defendant tq
plead to an alternative lesser offense over the prosecutor's objection where thei
evidence is also sufficient to present the greater offense to a jury, as here. See R. 36.
"[A]s long as the prosecution has probable cause to believe that an offense has been
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committed, the decision regarding ... in what manner to prosecute 'generally rests
entirely in [the prosecutor's] discretion/ " Bell, 785 P.2d at 402 (quoting Geer, 765
P.2d at 3) (other quotations and citations omitted).
Often times, little doubt may exist that a crime was committed, but some
ambiguity may exist, given the nature of the evidence, as to what particular crime
was committed. This is such a case. Defendant fired his handgun several times into
an area where partygoers were likely to be, and while doing so, shot the victim, who
was lying in a sleeping bag a short distance away. Although defendant claimed a
belief that he was firing into a log, there is little doubt that he committed a crime.
Just what that crime was depended on the facts.
Defendant may be guilty of third degree felony aggravated assault or of
reckless endangerment. He is guilty of a third degree aggravated assault if he
committed an assault (an act committed with unlawful force or violence that caused
bodily injury to another) using a dangerous weapon and did so under circumstances
not amounting to the intentional infliction of serious bodily injury to another. See
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102(1)(c) & § 76-5-103(l)(b), (3) (West 2004). Under this
variation of the statute, the "aggravated assault can be committed by reckless
conduct/'

State v. Speer, 750 P.2d 186, 191 (Utah 1988). On the other hand,

defendant is guilty of reckless endangerment "if, under circumstances not
amounting to a felony offense, [he] recklessly engaged in conduct that create[d] a
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substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to another person/ 7 Utah Cotie
Ann. § 76-5-112(1) (West 2004). The prosecutor had the discretion to charge and flry
the two offenses in the alternative. The trial court abused its discretion wheniit
precluded the prosecutor from exercising his prosecutorial discretion by insistiiig
that defendant be tried for the greater crime.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to reverse
the trial court's order and remand this case for further proceedings.
Respectfully submitted October 30,2007.
MARKL.SHURTLEFF
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL

^REY S. GRAY
^Assistant Attorney General
Counsel for Appellant
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JJJi DlSTRJciV!

MICHAEL D. ESPLIN (1009)
ESPLIN | WEIGHT
Attorneys for Defendant
290 West Center Street
P.O. Box "L"
Provo, Utah 84603-0200
Telephone: (801) 373-4912
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH

:

Plaintiff,

:

:

vs.

:

JACOB B. LOVELESS,

:

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
RE: DEFENDANT'S NOTICE
OF INTENT TO ENTER PLEA
TO ALTERNATIVE
OFFENSE AND STATE'S
MOTION TO RECONSIDER
Case No. 041403254

Division No. 3
Defendant.

:

This matter came on before the for hearing Court on April 9, 2007, on
Defendant's Notice of Intent to Enter Plea to one of the alternative offenses
charged in Count 1 of the Information and on April 10, 2007, on the State's
Motion to Reconsider Ruling. Having fully considered the pleadings,

1

memorandum submitted, the statement of the alleged victim, and oral
argument of counsel, being fully advised in the premises, the Court makes
the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. On August 18, 2004, the state filed an Information charging the
defendant in Count 1 with Reckless Endangerment, a Class A misdemeanor,
and Count 2, Carrying a Dangerous While Under the Influence of Alcohol or
a Controlled Substance, a Class B. misdemeanor.
2. On October 25, 2004, defendant appeared with counsel and entered
pleas of not guilty to both counts of the Information. The matter was set for
a pretrial conference to be held on December 9, 2004.
3. The parties appeared at the pretrial conference and the Court set
the matter for a jury trial to held on March 22 & 23, 2005.
4. On January 12, 2005, the state filed an Amended Information
alleging, Count 1: Aggravated Assault, in violation of U.C.A. §76-5-103, a
third degree felony, or, in the alternative, Reckless Endangerment, in
violation of U.C.A. § 76-5-112, a class A misdemeanor.

2

5. The jury trial was stricken and the matter was set for a preliminary
hearing.
6. On March 2, 2005, the preliminary hearing was held before the
Honorable Lynn W. Davis.
7. Following submission of a Motion to Quash Bindover, memoranda
in support and in opposition, and oral argument, on June 16, 2005, the Court
issued its ruling binding the defendant over on Count 1, containing the two
alternative charges, but dismissed Count 2.
8. Following other pretrial motions and hearing, this matter was set to
be tried on April 10 & 11, 2007.
9. On April 6, 2007, defendant filed a Notice of Intent to Enter Plea
of Guilty to Count 1, Reckless Endangerment.
10. The Court did not become aware of the notice until after 5:00
p.m., but was able to contact defense counsel by telephone and determine
that the plea was not a result of a plea bargain and that the state was opposed
to the entry of plea to the alternative offense. The Court instructed
defendant's counsel to contact Mr. Kennard, the attorney for the state in

3

413

order that the issue could be resolved at a hearing on Monday, April 9, 2007,
prior to the date of the jury trial.
11. The parties appeared on April 9, 2007, presented oral arguments to
the Court on the issue of whether the defendant should be allowed to enter
his plea to one of the alternative offenses in the Amended Information.
12. During the April 9, 2007 hearing, the state moved to amend the
Information by dismissing the alternative offense of Reckless
Endangerment.
13. Following the arguments of the parties, the Court denied the
motion of the state to amend as being untimely and as a response to
defendant's notice to enter plea. The Court also ruled that the defendant
should be allowed to enter his plea of guilty to the alternative offenses of
Reckless Endangerment.
14. The plea of the defendant was set to be entered on April 10, 2007.
15. The state filed a Motion to Reconsider Ruling on the afternoon of
April 9, 2007.
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16. On April 10, 2007, the court heard argument of the parties and
received a statement of the victim opposing the entry of plea.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The defendant has a right to enter a plea to the alternative offense
charged in Count 1. State v. Turner, is not applicable to the facts of this case
since Turner dealt with whether or not a defendant could enter a plea to a
count charging a lesser offenseniot the present case where the state has given
the defendant two options by charging in the alternative.
2. There is nothing in the rules that prevents the defendant from
pleading as charged without the approval of the state. Rule 17 (c) does not
require the state's approval if a defendant desires to plead as charged. There
is no case law that would allow the state to force a defendant who wants to
plead guilty to go to trial. The rule and State v. Studham, cited by the state,
stands for the proposition that the state has to agree to a bench trial rather
than a jury trial, not that the state can force a defendant to go to trial.
3. Rule 7(i)(2) states that the defendant shall be required to answer to
the charges*not that he must go to trial.
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4. Rule 9.5(b) does not apply as it deals with severance, nor does the
case submitted by the state apply to the issues before this Court.
5. Rule 11(d) does not prevent a defendant from entering a plea and is
not applicable to the issues before the Court.
RULING/ORDER
1. The motion to reconsider is denied. The defendant should be
allowed to enter his plea to the alternative charge of Reckless
Endangerment.
Dated this f ^ d a y of 1 ^ 2 0 0 7 .
BY THE COURT:»

CLAUDIA^£AYd<2gM i %
District Judge^
Approved:

''-^•-rpMi^W'
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